The Origins and Formation of Malaysia

The formation of Malaysia may appear to have been the completion of unfinished business and the last, rather predictable, chapter in the history of colonial empire in Southeast Asian. It came at the end of a spate of decolonization by the Macmillan government and at a time when European powers were generally eager to detach themselves from overseas dependencies if, indeed, they had not already done so. In fact, the principal components of the Malaysia project had previously passed beyond colonialism: Malaya had been independent since 31 August 1957 and, although sovereignty over Singapore lay with Britain until its transfer to Malaysia, the island enjoyed internal self-government from June 1959. Brunei (which had been expected to join the federation until the Sultan pulled out on the eve of the signing ceremony) was a protected state with its own sovereign ruler and, therefore, beyond British jurisdiction. Of the participating countries, only North Borneo and Sarawak were crown colonies, and, in a manner of speaking, only North Borneo and Sarawak were being decolonized. Indeed, as the final touches were put to Malaysia, the British presented it to the United Nations, not as a new state, but as an extension of an existing member-state, that is to say an extension of the independent Federation of Malaya to which Sabah (North Borneo), Sarawak and Singapore merely acceded. In short, the creation of Malaysia appears to have been an un-dramatic piece of house-keeping, an operation to tidy up the remnants of empire. But the documents expose another, rougher side to the story: one in which policy making snagged on the contradictions of multiple objectives; one in which Britain was buffeted by the conflicting demands of local politicians and interventions from outside; one in which events frequently brought planning to a standstill and deadlock fostered despondency; one in which resistance was met by guile or coercion, and the prospect of failure provoked desperate measures; one in which not all of Britain's objectives were fulfilled while some of its fears were realized. Indeed, the Malaysia that was inaugurated on 16 September 1963 failed wholly to satisfy any of the parties to it It was neither forged through nationalist struggle, nor did it reflect a homogeneous national identity. Rather it was the product of grudging compromise and underpinned by only fragile guarantees; its formation was peppered with resistance and that it came into being at all was regarded by many at the time as a close-run thing.

~ A J Stockwell , Institute of Commonwealth Studies

'Konfrantasi'

On 20 January, 1963, Dr. Subandrio announced that his country was adopting a policy of 'confrontation' towards Malaya pertaining the 'Malaysia plan'. It became clear soon after the tripartite Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Manila in June 1963 that the Indonesians did not feel themselves committed to accept anything less than a referendum in Borneo. Dr. Subandrio was soothing, but the Defence Minister, General Nasution, made plain his disapproval. He was Quoted as saying that ..."There have been various interpretations given to the Foreign Ministers' Meeting ... , but to us this is a matter of principle. We oppose Malaysia because it is 'neo-colonialism'; that confrontation would continue; and that 'We will assist our brothers in North Borneo to attain their right to self-determination."
Meanwhile, the benefits of Malaysia to the British looked uncertain. The 'Grand Design' turned out to be trouble, almost more trouble than it was worth. Britain was encumbered with the embarrassing obligation to protect the micro-state of Brunei. Moreover,Singapore's separation in August 1965 seemed a disaster, since the British government had always regarded the merger of Malaya and Singapore as the principal advantage of Malaysia, if not its raison d'etre.
Constrained by circumstances beyond British control, plans were deflected by events and the outcome fell short of expectations in several respects. As inauguration day drew near, 'Malaysia plan' was placed in jeopardy by greater or lesser crises: unresolved disputes between Malaya and Singapore; a last-minute hitch in the relations between Malaya and Sarawak; the United Nations mission to Borneo; Indonesian 'Confrontation'; an attempt by Kelantan to win an injunction against the implementation of the Malaysia Act Indeed, a nation-state had yet to be fashioned from Britain's former dependencies and in the following years resentment of control from Kuala Lumpur would fester in Sabah and Sarawak and force Singapore to secede.

[ the first experimental hovercraft,SRN-5,tested in Tawau during the 'Konfrantasi' ,courtesy of Australian War Museum]

Borneo political reactions to 'Greater Malaysia Plan' [July 9 ~ July 15 1961]

Political leaders in the Borneo Territories have commented on the general outline of the Greater Malaysia Plan described by Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya ,Tunku Abdul Rahman , during his visit to Brunei and Sarawak.
The Tunku made it clear that he would like to see Sarawak,North Borneo and Brunei become States of Malaya and had the following points to make ;
~ that it would be difficult for the Borneo territories to be independent on their own without having the necessary resources to meet the cost involved and to develop their countries.
~ that in coming in as states of Malaya , they "would enjoy absolute equality" with the other autonomous states.
~ that they would also enjoy the same privileges and benefits as the other states and  that money would go towards their development.
~ that there was no need for the Borneo territories to form a federation and achieve independence before joining in with Malaya.
The first reaction in Borneo to the Plan came from the Sarawak United People's Party which , in a statement issued in Kuching on July 8th 1961, said that any question of federation with Malaya by Sarawak should be postponed until after independence had been achieved.
The Party went on to say that it would welcome any assistance from Malaya or from any other country in its fight for independence and that it would be prepared to take part in any meeting , such as that was suggested by the Socialist Front of Malaya ,to examine the implications of the Plan.
A joint statement was next issued in Jesselton [Kota Kinabalu] by Ong Kee Hui,chairman of Sarawak United People's Party ; A.M. Azahari, President of the Parti Rakyat Brunei ; and Donald Stephen, a prominent North Borneo leader, who is taking a leading part in the formation of his country's first political party.
They said ; " We met in Jesselton to discuss and consider current political developments which affect the three territories . We believe that it is vitally important that the constitutional advance in the three territories should be speed up and with this in view , elections should be held in the territories where an undertaking has been given by the Governments concerned so that the legitimate aspirations of the people for political advancement can be satisfied. We further agreed that there should be frequent exchange of views and discussions on matters of common interest by political leaders of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. It was agreed that a United Front should be taken on this important matter and that the British Government should be advise that so far as the wishes of the people of the three territories can be ascertained , any plan in accordance with the pronouncements made by Tunku Abdul Rahman in Brunei and Sarawak would be totally unacceptable to the people of the three territories."

# 97 . National Archive , co 10301987, no 1128 . 19 Mar 1962

[CO officials drafted for the secretary of state a long rejection of the Tunku's allegations which was eventually submitted to the prime minister in an abbreviated form. They argued that the Tunku's conduct was dangerously unacceptable and, in his brief for ministerial discussions of this, MaudJing's private secretary pointed out: 'we cannot bounce Borneo on the basis of the Tunku's present thinking; these are not just a bunch of head-hunters who have no ideas at all, or whose views can be ignored; we are all in favour of Greater Malaysia but it will have to be handled with more finesse than the Tunku is showing' (CO 10301987, no 1146) While CO officials pressed for a strong ministerial riposte, however, the CRO was inclined to let the matter drop, and following discussion in the Cabinet Greater Malaysia Committee on 21 Mar, it was decided to take the matter no further with the Tunku (see 98).]

I promised you my comments on the Tunku's attack on Borneo civil servants and also to send you Cobbold's note of his preliminary impressions of the prospects for Malaysia. I enclose a copy of his note.

2. The Tunku's accusation that British officials in North Borneo are sabotaging our plans for Malaysia and are at most apathetic is quite unjustified. We have this from the Governor/ there has been the statement by the President of the North Borneo Civil Servants' Association of which I attach a copy,3 and I have personal confirmation of what they say from Sir John Martin, who spent most of January in Borneo and made it his particular business to talk to as many British officials as he could meet· All this is now confirmed in unequivocal terms by Cobbold in his two telegrams C.67 and G.68,5 the background to which is in his note.

3. The administrations in Borneo are not being paternalistic but realistic. They are entirely with us in wanting to see Malaysia brought about But, as Cobbold says, the people do not feel themselves blood brothers to the Malays and, if there is to be a marriage, and it is to survive, it will have to be one of mutual convenience. That means that the terms will have to be acceptable to the peoples in Borneo.

4. There is in fact no hope of an early and successful Greater Malaysia without British Officials. That is a particular reason why the Tunku's outburst is so unfortunate. The officers will stay on when the territories cease to be British colonies only if they want to stay. Some will go anyway-this always happens-but the urge to go will be greatly increased if it is made clear by this sort of public attack that they are not trusted by their future Prime Minister.

5. We have got to get the points in the two preceding paragraphs across to the Tunku if there is to be hope of Malaysia. My first thought is that this could best be done in a message from you to the Tunku. A draft is being prepared which will be available for our discussion on Wednesday.

6. I am not commenting here in any detail on Cobbold's note-as he says he may change his views completely. In general it contains no real surprises. A transitional stage, as he suggests, with sovereignty handed over, but much responsibility remaining with us, is a possibility we have thought of, but it would of course be very

difficult to work in practice. I see Cobbold does not feel the need for legal advice yet-he will certainly need it on this sort of thing when the Commission come to write their report.

7. The only other point I would comment on here is his suggestion that there should be a Governmental conference not more than two months after his report, which he hopes to get out before the end of May (that would mean the end of July or August for the conference). I very much doubt if two months would be long enough for printing, translation and dissemination in the territories and debates in their legislatures and for our own and the Malayan Government's consideration. I would think September a more likely time.

8. I am sending copies of this minute and its enclosure to the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary and Minister of Defence.

# 96. National Archive , co 1030/987, no 1108 12 Mar 1962

[The Tunku's accusations that British colonial servants in Borneo were hampering preparations for Malaysia, were printed in the Straits Times and reached the British press too. In a follow-up telegram on the same day, Tory informed the CRO that the Tunku was 'unrepentant' while Wong Pow Nee and Ghazali (the Malayan members of the Cobbold Commission) were complaining of 'rude treatment in North Borneo'. In asking the secretary of state for an explanation, Macmillan wondered whether the attack was 'really a manoeuvre by the Tunku to forestall Communist criticism' (Macmillan to Maudling, 12 Mar 1962, CO 10301987, no 1112). Drawing upon material written at the time, Ghazali Shafie has described warm receptions in Sarawak and North Borneo and attributed such 'rudeness' there was on the part of local people to their coaching by die-hard British expatriates, see Memoir, pp 197-229.]

Today's Straits Times publishes following front page report of interview with Tunku 11th March under banner headlines 'British Civil Servants in Borneo territories hampering Malaysia' 'Tengku accuses' 'Resident snubs Ghazali, Wong.

Tengku Abdul Rahman today accused British civil servants in Borneo territories of hampering Malaysia. Tenku said 'British civil servants in Borneo territories can do a lot to influence people, especially natives, because of their high position. 'However, they are very antagonistic towards Malaysia. They have now been persuaded not to take an active part in opposing Malaysia. Instead, they have adopted an apathetic attitude' he stressed that 'opinion' of British civil servants in Borneo territories did not count as far  as he was concerned as he had already obtained agreement of the British Government to Malaysia concept 'I do realise necessity that they (British civil servants) should not be allowed to influence natives, like Malays and Dyaks.' 'The British civil servants in their position can do a lot of harm,' he said. Tengku said that a British resident in North Borneo had snubbed Malayan members of Cobbold Commission at a cocktail party 'in full view of everybody'. He said 'So bitter was the British civil servants opposition to Malaysia that when Wong Pow Nee and Ghazali were leaving the party, the British resident involved did not have courtesy or politeness, as one would expect from a British official in high position, to stand up and bid guests farewell'. Tengku added 'When matter was reported to me personally by Dato Wong and Inche Ghazali on their return to Kuala Lumpur last week, I was really very annoyed at this complete lack of courtesy, politeness and good manners on part of the host'. He would bring this to notice of Governor. Tunku said that, beside British civil servants, people in Borneo territories opposing Malaysia were Chinese people and businessmen, and British merchants. He recalled that various Chinese millionaires were opposed to Merdekal fearing chaos and disaster but no single Chinese in Malaya did not agree with Malayan independence now. Look at their wealth. Regarding British businessmen in Borneo territories opposing Malaysia, Tengku said he could not understand their attitude 'these people merely want to cling to their possessions without due regard for changing situation'. North Borneo had not  been an easy place to push forward concept of Malaysia but it had dedicated people like Donald Stephens and Dato Mustapha who believed in Malaysia. Danger facing Borneo territories was 'clear enough for everyone to see'. 'I don't have to repeat it time and again. We can all see threat of Communists. If I did not see this danger I would not be bothered with other territories like Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. 'Why should I really bother with these territories, if I did not see the danger ahead for us and for them. I am happy to have Malaya which is rich, prosperous and enjoying peace and security.' Dealing with Singapore, which might require 'some special attention' he said he was certain that Singapore could not become an independent country. 'Singapore finds it a bit hard to accept merger terms because it has always regarded itself as a little China' he said.

~ Keith Wookey ,Sandakan Resident , & Tunku Abd Rahman  during a visit to Sandakan after a failed attempt by Ghazali Shafie to promote the Malaysia Plan ,also known as the 'Grand Design'

Lord Lansdowne on preparations to implement Malaysia through the Inter-Governmental Committee.

Report on visit to North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei by the minister of state for colonial affairs from 14 August to 30 August, 1962': report by Lord Lansdowne on preparations to implement Malaysia through the Inter-Governmental Committee.

CAB 134/1951, GM(62)42 10 Sept 1962.

[The agreement of 31 July 1962 (see 140), to bring about a Federation of Malaysia by 31 Aug 1963, required an Inter-Governmental Committee to work out the future constitutional arrangements and necessary safeguards for North Borneo and Sarawak. As Lansdowne reports here, however, the London announcement came 'as a great shock' to North Borneo. On 13-14 Aug Donald Stephens convened a meeting of political leaders who drew up a fourteen-point (later twenty-point) programme of minimum demands. These Twenty Points gained weight by attracting support in Sarawak and went far beyond what the Malayans had conceded at the London talks in July. Although North Borneo's Legislative Council and Sarawak's Council Negri agreed to the principle of Malaysia (on 12 and 26 Sept respectively), they did so on condition that state rights were safeguarded. The IGC was chaired by Lord Lansdowne, with Tun Razak as deputy chairman, and had representatives from Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak. There were no members from Singapore while Brunei sent observers. Lansdowne and Razak visited Borneo in Aug (as reported in this document) and at a preparatory meeting of the IGC in Jesselton on 30 Aug fIve sub-committees are set up. The sub-committees (all chaired up by Sir John Martin) covered constitutional, fiscal, legal and Judicial matters, public service, and departmental organisation. H P Hall and T J O'Brien, who was seconded from the British high commission in KL, serviced the IGC. The first sub-committee met on 8 Oct and plenary sessions were held on 22:-24 Oct, 23-26 Nov and 18-20 Dec , after which remaining points of detail were remitted to an ad hoc committee of specialists. Deadlock almost occurred over financial issues and development aid but these matters were eventually resolved. As regards constitutional relations, although they failed to secure an Initial seven-year period during which legislative power should remain within the state (rather than being delegated to it), North Borneo and Sarawak won a number of safeguards which could not be changed by the federal government without the concurrence of the state government. To prevent amendment of the federal constitution, however, they would require a two-thirds majority in the federal house of representatives which they could achieve only by voting together and also in concert with Singapore. Lansdowne's interim reports went to the Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee, see 146. The final report was initialled on 22 Jan 1963 and published on 27 Feb as Malaysia: Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962 (Cmnd 1954). The Council Negri of Sarawak adopted its recommendations on 8 Mar and North Borneo's Legislative Council followed suit on 13 Mar (CO 1030/1032; CO 1030/1050; COl030/1052, no 73; CO 103011053-1057, 1065-1067; GM(62)44 and GM(62)46, CAB 13411951; DO 1891259; FO 3711169694, nos 10 and 11).]

On 1st August, it was announced in Parliament that the British and Malayan Governments had decided in principle that the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963. It was also announced that detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, would be drawn up after consultation with the legislatures of the two territories. An Intergovernmental Committee was to be established as soon as possible on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and Sarawak Governments would be represented. The task of the Intergovernmental Committee, of which I was to be Chairman, would be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards for the two territories.

2. I arrived in Jesselton on 14th August and was joined at Kuching on 18th August by Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya.

3. The primary purpose of our visit was to set up the Intergovernmental Committee, but first it was necessary to promote acceptance of the early date for Malaysia and also to attempt to allay the anxieties, both of the people and of the British officers, over what appeared to many of them as a Malayan 'take-over'. We therefore travelled the territories extensively and with our Malayan colleagues met as many of the leaders of the people as possible and talked also with the expatriate and locally employed officers. At our meetings we explained the concept of Malaysia and described how the Intergovernmental Committee would work. We listened to a great number of opinions on special safeguards for the territories. We emphasized that we were not a repeat order of the Cobbold Commission and explained that it was the responsibility of the representatives of the four Governments in the Intergovernmental Committee to work out the form of the necessary safeguards.

4. Mr. PhiIip Rogers· in my party was specifically charged with the task of discussing a compensation scheme with the British expatriate officers.

5. At the London talks, the territories were represented by the Governor of North Borneo, Sir William Goode and the Governor of Sarawak, Sir Alexander Waddell. Unfortunately, Sir Alexander WaddeII had to remain in London owing to illness. Sir William Goode returned to North Borneo on 3rd August and was able to do a lot to take the edge off the consternation caused by the London decision. Nevertheless, when we arrived in Jesselton, it was still clear that the London announcement had come as a great shock.

6. In our numerous meetings, all our conversations were directed towards correcting the basic misconception that Her Majesty's Government was about to sanction a Malayan 'take-over' and that the progress and happiness of the peoples of the territories were being sacrificed to world politics. Although much had been done by British officers to popularize the concept of Malaysia, even amongst people who were in favour of it there were grave misgivings about the speed with which it was being brought about. As our tour proceeded, and with the help of good publicity, there was a general improvement in attitude. Both the concept of Malaysia and its early date gained more general acceptance. But this acceptance was conditional upon the Intergovernmental Committee agreeing constitutional arrangements which would meet the anxieties and aspirations of the territories.

7. The improvement in the political climate could not have been brought about without the consistent help and tactful guidance of Sir William Goode and Mr. Jakeway, the Officer Administering the Government of Sarawak. Equally our mission could have achieved no success without the co-operation of Tun Razak and his colleagues. Although this British-Malayan mission has helped to restore confidence, it is my opinion that the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Committee will require the most careful handling.

8. The main problems with which the Intergovernmental Committee will have to

deal are:-

(a) Freedom of religion.

(b) English as an official language and medium of instruction.

(c) Heads of the States and their eligibility for Headship of the Federation.

(d) Representation in Federal legislature.

(e) Division of financial control between Federal and State legislatures.

(0 Funds for development

(g) Control of immigration.

(h) Citizenship.

(i) Degree of State autonomy within the Federation.

(j) Safeguards against future amendment to Federation and State constitutions.

Views were expressed both orally and in memoranda on all these subjects, and by the end of our tour the North Borneo political parties had agreed a joint memorandum outlining their views. It seems likely that the political parties in Sarawak will also attempt to reach an agreed line. The only organized political opposition to the concept of Malaysia is from the Communist controlled left-wing of the S.U.P.P. in Sarawak.

9. I had a two hours private talk with the Sultan of Brunei in the middle of our tour. The Sultan wished to know how the Intergovernmental Committee would work and all his questions on Malaysia were directed towards ascertaining how we thought he would fit into the picture. As I stonewalled, he asked whether I thought he should put up proposals to the Malayan Government. I reminded him that Sir John Martin had suggested this in March.2 (The Sultan had in fact already set up a Committee, of which the High Commissioner, Sir Denis White, is a member, to study the situation and to formulate proposals. I understood that this Committee was to meet shortly after our visit.)

I am convinced that the main attraction of Malaysia to the Sultan is in the hope of protecting his own position by joining the Sultan's [sic) Club. He also wishes to be Agong of the Federation and has been offered this carrot by the Malayans. He will certainly fight hard for the maximum control of State revenues. Whatever he does will closely affect the Bornean discussions. Tun Razak who visited the Sultan earlier last month had tentatively agreed to the Sultan sending observers to the Intergovernmental Committee. As I thought this might strengthen our position, I accepted Tun Razak's suggestion and formally invited the Sultan to send observers. This he agreed to do at the first plenary session in October.

10. We held a preparatory meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee in Jesselton on 30th August and agreed that the following Sub-Committees should be set up:-

Constitutional.

Fiscal.

Public Service.

Legal and Judicial.

Departmental Organization.

The first plenary meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee will be held at its headquarters in Jesselton in the middle of October and will be attended by Tun Razak and myself. Meanwhile, under the supervision of permanent representatives of the four governments, the work of the Sub-Committee is proceeding. I have reserved the right of Chairmanship of all committees to the British.

11. The joint submission of the North Borneo political parties goes well beyond what the Malayans appeared to be prepared to concede in London. Throughout the London talks, the Malayans consistently under-estimated the difficulties involved in the accession of the territories to Malaysia. Thanks, however, to the frank and forceful way in which the Borneans expressed their views throughout our tour, the Malayans accepted the reality of the difficulties. Dato Aziz even went so far as to acknowledge to Sir William Goode that whereas in London he had considered the Governors' attitude obstructive, he now realized that they had only been representing the true views of the people. He repeated this admission in the presence of a number of colleagues in Kuala Lumpur. I believe that our Malayan colleagues now realize that British concern over the (orm of Malaysia is directed solely towards the determination to create a federation which will stick.

12. Our tour enabled our Malayan colleagues to obtain a more realistic appreciation of the situation in the territories. Much will depend, however, upon the impression formed by the Tunku himself after his visit to the territories this month. If agreed solutions are to be reached in the Intergovernmental Committee, the Malayans will have to make concessions. There are as yet only very slight indications that they may be prepared to do so.

13. It is impossible to forecast how many of the British officers will remain. The chief factors upon which they will make their decision are:-

(1) The constitutional arrangements and safeguards agreed by the Intergovernmental

Committee.

(2) Terms of compensation and inducement

(3) The length of service to which they may look forward.

(4) Personal considerations.

In my opinion it is most important that the British officers should know the terms of compensation and inducement by the end of this year. I have requested the Governments of the territories to work out as quickly as possible the probable rate of Borneanization of the Service. The form of Malaysia and the role which the British officers will be called upon to play will be quite as important to them as any financial consideration.

14. It was suggested to us that the Malayans, in claiming that Malaysia would bring about an accelerated rate of development in the territories, were offering a 'false prospectus'. It was argued that if the price of rubber continued to fall and jf British Colonial and Development Welfare aid were no longer forthcoming, the rate of Bornean development must inevitably be retarded. The view was expressed both by Bornean and British speakers that the idea of Malaysia was accepted because the British who were responsible for the territories recommended it If the territories suffered thereby, the British would be to blame. Not only was the wish that the British officers should remain repeatedly expressed, but also the fervent hope that British financial aid should not be withdrawn. I am bound to say that in view of the fact that Her Majesty's Government is giving up its responsibility for the territories before they are ready to achieve independence on their own, we have a continuing obligation to help them. I consider that we cannot honourably discharge this obligation to the peoples of the territories whom we are persuading to accept Malaysia, unless we maintain our assistance after Federation at a level not lower than the existing Colonial Development and Welfare grants. This should not include the cost of any compensation scheme. If Malaysia is to fulfill the hopes we have for it, it must be demonstrably successful and successful from the start and this will cost money.

15. I would like to record my gratitude to the first-class team which accompanied me and with them to express our thanks to the Governors, the High Commissioner and the officers throughout the territories for the invaluable assistance and co:operation which they gave to us and our Malayan colleagues. Despite short notice, all the arrangements made for our travel and meetings were admirably organized.

…., there was also doubt about the motives of the possible rebels.  What did they want?  Much of this has to do with the enigmatic performance of Azahari.  In September 1962,  The Borneo Bulletin  had two

statements on the front page from Azahari.  In one he talked about a meeting with leaders in Sarawak and North Borneo to press for the creation of “an independent federation of Borneo.”  In the other, in an interview with the Sultan, he pledged the support of his party to the ruler’s acceptance in principle of the proposed plan for Malaysia.Early in December, Azahari announced that three motions would

be proposed at the first meeting of the new Legislative Council:

(i) Rejecting Malaysia.

(ii) Requesting the restoration of Brunei sovereignty over Sarawak

and North Borneo.

(iii) Calling for a British grant of independence to a Borneo

federation not later than 1963.

The Party Rakyat appear to have been genuine in their belief that the findings of the Cobbold Commission were fraudulent and had hopes of popular support in Sarawak and North Borneo.

The Sultan of Brunei saw the uprising as a rebellion against joining the Federation. In this sense the popular mood contrasted sharply with the views of the Sultan’s  closest advisors.  Many of the appointed members of the Legislative Council were happy in principle to be part of the new

Malaysia; though some voiced doubts and concerns over the concessions demanded by Kuala Lumpur.

The Sultan had no intention of surrendering his sovereignty to the PRB by fleeing the country.  The Sultan and the people shared one thing in common.  They were fed up with the protracted negotiations over the new Federation.  The people feared their country would be coerced into joining; the Sultan believed that while Brunei was a Protectorate with very considerable control over its affairs, Malaya was a former colony.