Report on visit to North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei by the minister of state for colonial affairs from 14 August to 30 August, 1962': report by Lord Lansdowne on preparations to implement Malaysia through the Inter-Governmental Committee.
CAB 134/1951, GM(62)42 10 Sept 1962.
[The agreement of 31 July 1962 (see 140), to bring about a Federation of Malaysia by 31 Aug 1963, required an Inter-Governmental Committee to work out the future constitutional arrangements and necessary safeguards for North Borneo and Sarawak. As Lansdowne reports here, however, the London announcement came 'as a great shock' to North Borneo. On 13-14 Aug Donald Stephens convened a meeting of political leaders who drew up a fourteen-point (later twenty-point) programme of minimum demands. These Twenty Points gained weight by attracting support in Sarawak and went far beyond what the Malayans had conceded at the London talks in July. Although North Borneo's Legislative Council and Sarawak's Council Negri agreed to the principle of Malaysia (on 12 and 26 Sept respectively), they did so on condition that state rights were safeguarded. The IGC was chaired by Lord Lansdowne, with Tun Razak as deputy chairman, and had representatives from Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak. There were no members from Singapore while Brunei sent observers. Lansdowne and Razak visited Borneo in Aug (as reported in this document) and at a preparatory meeting of the IGC in Jesselton on 30 Aug fIve sub-committees are set up. The sub-committees (all chaired up by Sir John Martin) covered constitutional, fiscal, legal and Judicial matters, public service, and departmental organisation. H P Hall and T J O'Brien, who was seconded from the British high commission in KL, serviced the IGC. The first sub-committee met on 8 Oct and plenary sessions were held on 22:-24 Oct, 23-26 Nov and 18-20 Dec , after which remaining points of detail were remitted to an ad hoc committee of specialists. Deadlock almost occurred over financial issues and development aid but these matters were eventually resolved. As regards constitutional relations, although they failed to secure an Initial seven-year period during which legislative power should remain within the state (rather than being delegated to it), North Borneo and Sarawak won a number of safeguards which could not be changed by the federal government without the concurrence of the state government. To prevent amendment of the federal constitution, however, they would require a two-thirds majority in the federal house of representatives which they could achieve only by voting together and also in concert with Singapore. Lansdowne's interim reports went to the Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee, see 146. The final report was initialled on 22 Jan 1963 and published on 27 Feb as Malaysia: Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962 (Cmnd 1954). The Council Negri of Sarawak adopted its recommendations on 8 Mar and North Borneo's Legislative Council followed suit on 13 Mar (CO 1030/1032; CO 1030/1050; COl030/1052, no 73; CO 103011053-1057, 1065-1067; GM(62)44 and GM(62)46, CAB 13411951; DO 1891259; FO 3711169694, nos 10 and 11).]
On 1st August, it was announced in Parliament that the British and Malayan Governments had decided in principle that the proposed Federation of Malaysia should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963. It was also announced that detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, would be drawn up after consultation with the legislatures of the two territories. An Intergovernmental Committee was to be established as soon as possible on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and Sarawak Governments would be represented. The task of the Intergovernmental Committee, of which I was to be Chairman, would be to work out the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the necessary safeguards for the two territories.
2. I arrived in Jesselton on 14th August and was joined at Kuching on 18th August by Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya.
3. The primary purpose of our visit was to set up the Intergovernmental Committee, but first it was necessary to promote acceptance of the early date for Malaysia and also to attempt to allay the anxieties, both of the people and of the British officers, over what appeared to many of them as a Malayan 'take-over'. We therefore travelled the territories extensively and with our Malayan colleagues met as many of the leaders of the people as possible and talked also with the expatriate and locally employed officers. At our meetings we explained the concept of Malaysia and described how the Intergovernmental Committee would work. We listened to a great number of opinions on special safeguards for the territories. We emphasized that we were not a repeat order of the Cobbold Commission and explained that it was the responsibility of the representatives of the four Governments in the Intergovernmental Committee to work out the form of the necessary safeguards.
4. Mr. PhiIip Rogers· in my party was specifically charged with the task of discussing a compensation scheme with the British expatriate officers.
5. At the London talks, the territories were represented by the Governor of North Borneo, Sir William Goode and the Governor of Sarawak, Sir Alexander Waddell. Unfortunately, Sir Alexander WaddeII had to remain in London owing to illness. Sir William Goode returned to North Borneo on 3rd August and was able to do a lot to take the edge off the consternation caused by the London decision. Nevertheless, when we arrived in Jesselton, it was still clear that the London announcement had come as a great shock.
6. In our numerous meetings, all our conversations were directed towards correcting the basic misconception that Her Majesty's Government was about to sanction a Malayan 'take-over' and that the progress and happiness of the peoples of the territories were being sacrificed to world politics. Although much had been done by British officers to popularize the concept of Malaysia, even amongst people who were in favour of it there were grave misgivings about the speed with which it was being brought about. As our tour proceeded, and with the help of good publicity, there was a general improvement in attitude. Both the concept of Malaysia and its early date gained more general acceptance. But this acceptance was conditional upon the Intergovernmental Committee agreeing constitutional arrangements which would meet the anxieties and aspirations of the territories.
7. The improvement in the political climate could not have been brought about without the consistent help and tactful guidance of Sir William Goode and Mr. Jakeway, the Officer Administering the Government of Sarawak. Equally our mission could have achieved no success without the co-operation of Tun Razak and his colleagues. Although this British-Malayan mission has helped to restore confidence, it is my opinion that the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Committee will require the most careful handling.
8. The main problems with which the Intergovernmental Committee will have to
deal are:-
(a) Freedom of religion.
(b) English as an official language and medium of instruction.
(c) Heads of the States and their eligibility for Headship of the Federation.
(d) Representation in Federal legislature.
(e) Division of financial control between Federal and State legislatures.
(0 Funds for development
(g) Control of immigration.
(h) Citizenship.
(i) Degree of State autonomy within the Federation.
(j) Safeguards against future amendment to Federation and State constitutions.
Views were expressed both orally and in memoranda on all these subjects, and by the end of our tour the North Borneo political parties had agreed a joint memorandum outlining their views. It seems likely that the political parties in Sarawak will also attempt to reach an agreed line. The only organized political opposition to the concept of Malaysia is from the Communist controlled left-wing of the S.U.P.P. in Sarawak.
9. I had a two hours private talk with the Sultan of Brunei in the middle of our tour. The Sultan wished to know how the Intergovernmental Committee would work and all his questions on Malaysia were directed towards ascertaining how we thought he would fit into the picture. As I stonewalled, he asked whether I thought he should put up proposals to the Malayan Government. I reminded him that Sir John Martin had suggested this in March.2 (The Sultan had in fact already set up a Committee, of which the High Commissioner, Sir Denis White, is a member, to study the situation and to formulate proposals. I understood that this Committee was to meet shortly after our visit.)
I am convinced that the main attraction of Malaysia to the Sultan is in the hope of protecting his own position by joining the Sultan's [sic) Club. He also wishes to be Agong of the Federation and has been offered this carrot by the Malayans. He will certainly fight hard for the maximum control of State revenues. Whatever he does will closely affect the Bornean discussions. Tun Razak who visited the Sultan earlier last month had tentatively agreed to the Sultan sending observers to the Intergovernmental Committee. As I thought this might strengthen our position, I accepted Tun Razak's suggestion and formally invited the Sultan to send observers. This he agreed to do at the first plenary session in October.
10. We held a preparatory meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee in Jesselton on 30th August and agreed that the following Sub-Committees should be set up:-
Constitutional.
Fiscal.
Public Service.
Legal and Judicial.
Departmental Organization.
The first plenary meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee will be held at its headquarters in Jesselton in the middle of October and will be attended by Tun Razak and myself. Meanwhile, under the supervision of permanent representatives of the four governments, the work of the Sub-Committee is proceeding. I have reserved the right of Chairmanship of all committees to the British.
11. The joint submission of the North Borneo political parties goes well beyond what the Malayans appeared to be prepared to concede in London. Throughout the London talks, the Malayans consistently under-estimated the difficulties involved in the accession of the territories to Malaysia. Thanks, however, to the frank and forceful way in which the Borneans expressed their views throughout our tour, the Malayans accepted the reality of the difficulties. Dato Aziz even went so far as to acknowledge to Sir William Goode that whereas in London he had considered the Governors' attitude obstructive, he now realized that they had only been representing the true views of the people. He repeated this admission in the presence of a number of colleagues in Kuala Lumpur. I believe that our Malayan colleagues now realize that British concern over the (orm of Malaysia is directed solely towards the determination to create a federation which will stick.
12. Our tour enabled our Malayan colleagues to obtain a more realistic appreciation of the situation in the territories. Much will depend, however, upon the impression formed by the Tunku himself after his visit to the territories this month. If agreed solutions are to be reached in the Intergovernmental Committee, the Malayans will have to make concessions. There are as yet only very slight indications that they may be prepared to do so.
13. It is impossible to forecast how many of the British officers will remain. The chief factors upon which they will make their decision are:-
(1) The constitutional arrangements and safeguards agreed by the Intergovernmental
Committee.
(2) Terms of compensation and inducement
(3) The length of service to which they may look forward.
(4) Personal considerations.
In my opinion it is most important that the British officers should know the terms of compensation and inducement by the end of this year. I have requested the Governments of the territories to work out as quickly as possible the probable rate of Borneanization of the Service. The form of Malaysia and the role which the British officers will be called upon to play will be quite as important to them as any financial consideration.
14. It was suggested to us that the Malayans, in claiming that Malaysia would bring about an accelerated rate of development in the territories, were offering a 'false prospectus'. It was argued that if the price of rubber continued to fall and jf British Colonial and Development Welfare aid were no longer forthcoming, the rate of Bornean development must inevitably be retarded. The view was expressed both by Bornean and British speakers that the idea of Malaysia was accepted because the British who were responsible for the territories recommended it If the territories suffered thereby, the British would be to blame. Not only was the wish that the British officers should remain repeatedly expressed, but also the fervent hope that British financial aid should not be withdrawn. I am bound to say that in view of the fact that Her Majesty's Government is giving up its responsibility for the territories before they are ready to achieve independence on their own, we have a continuing obligation to help them. I consider that we cannot honourably discharge this obligation to the peoples of the territories whom we are persuading to accept Malaysia, unless we maintain our assistance after Federation at a level not lower than the existing Colonial Development and Welfare grants. This should not include the cost of any compensation scheme. If Malaysia is to fulfill the hopes we have for it, it must be demonstrably successful and successful from the start and this will cost money.
15. I would like to record my gratitude to the first-class team which accompanied me and with them to express our thanks to the Governors, the High Commissioner and the officers throughout the territories for the invaluable assistance and co:operation which they gave to us and our Malayan colleagues. Despite short notice, all the arrangements made for our travel and meetings were admirably organized.
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